We exploit the unique experimental design of a social program to understand how cash transfers to eligible households indirectly affect the consumption of ineligible households living in the same villages. This indirect effect on consumption is positive, and it operates through insurance and credit markets: ineligible households benefit from their neighbors' higher income by receiving more transfers, by borrowing more, and by reducing their precautionary savings. This exercise shows 1) how social programs may benefit the local economy at large, not only the treated; 2) how this beneficial effect is spread in the locality through informal credit and insurance arrangements; 3) how looking only at the effect on the treated results in an underestimation of the program impact. One should analyze the effects of this type of program on the entire local economy, rather than on the treated only, and use a village-level randomization, rather than selecting treatment and control subjects from the same community. * We are grateful to Orazio Attanasio, Richard Blundell, Price Fishback, Kei Hirano, Costas Meghir, Nicola Pavoni, Imran Rasul, and Andreas Uthemann. We are indebted with Vincenzo Di Maro for sharing his data on caloric intakes. A special thanks to Adam Szeidl. The usual disclaimer applies.
Introduction
Policy interventions in developing countries are likely to affect all the residents of the areas where they are implemented. The program evaluation literature, however, is mainly focused on estimating the program effects on the treated, rather than the effects on the non-treated or locality-wide effects. These indirect effects may be large in communities where the lack of formal markets and institutions creates strong interactions between small groups of households. This paper estimates the indirect effects of the flagship Mexican welfare program, Progresa, on the consumption of ineligible households, and studies the mechanisms through which these indirect effects occur.
Started in 1997 and still ongoing, Progresa's aim is improving poor households' education, health, and nutrition through sizeable cash transfers. In our sample of rural villages, more than half of the households are treated. The targeted villages are small and agriculture is the main, and often sole economic activity. The exposure to natural disasters, the absence of formal credit and insurance institutions, and extensive within-village kinship relationships create incentives to engage in informal risk-sharing activities. If this is the case, treated households will share part of their higher income with members of their social network through gifts or loans. Therefore, the entire village will benefit from the program.
Understanding the program's indirect effects and their causes is important for three reasons: first, because this type of program has become very popular and therefore a careful evaluation is needed. Second, the study of indirect effects has implications for the design of policies and of the experiments to evaluate them. Third, and more broadly, this exercise enables us to see how a positive income shock is transmitted through the local economy.
We can estimate these effects under fairly weak identification assumptions because of the unique design of the experimental trial and evaluation data. There is a village-level randomization and we have a census of all households, irrespective of eligibility for the treatment.
Thus, we have information on four groups: eligible and ineligible households in treatment and control villages. Ineligible households in control villages provide a valid counterfactual for the ineligibles in treatment villages under the assumptions that assignment is truly random and control villages are not indirectly affected by the program. The identification relies on the fact that only a subgroup of households in the village is eligible for a particular policy (Moffitt, 2001) . A comparison of ineligible households' consumption, loans, and transfers in treatment and control villages enables us to identify the indirect effect of the program on these outcomes.
If villagers share risk, Progresa will cause an increase in consumption, loans, and transfers for ineligible families. Consistent with those predictions, food consumption for the ineligibles in treated villages increases by about 10% per month per adult equivalent in May and November 1999. This effect is roughly 50% of the average increase in food consumption for eligible adults since November 1998; failure to consider this indirect effect results in a 12% underestimate of the treatment impact. Ineligible households in treatment villages consume more by borrowing more money (mainly from family and friends), by receiving more transfers, and, to a small extent, by reducing their stock of grains and animals at the beginning of the program.
We rule out alternative potential causes for the observed consumption increase, including changes in labor earnings and increases in both goods prices and income from higher sales caused by a higher demand. Therefore, we conclude that the indirect program effect on consumption is not generated by an increase in earnings.
A limitation of the program evaluation literature is that there is often a sizeable difference between the experimental estimates of treatment effects and the effect of the policy on the population. This normally occurs for two reasons. Usually one can only estimate the treatment effect on the treated or the eligibles, and not, as in our case, its indirect effect on the ineligibles. Second, the experiment normally involves a small fraction of the relevant population; when a program is rolled-out nationwide, it may have general equilibrium effects that offset the partial equilibrium ones estimated from experimental data. Our analysis does not suffer from this limitation because we observe the treatment effect on the ineligibles. Further, in our case this effect is not a function of the number of treated villages, but of the existence of informal risksharing networks. As long as informal networks are an important tool to insure against risk, we can predict positive indirect effects on consumption irrespective of the number of localities that receive Progresa assistance. Thus, contrary to many active labor market programs, in this class of policies the indirect treatment effects reinforce the direct effects.
We contribute to the program evaluation literature in several ways. First, we show that a class of widely implemented aid policies has large positive indirect effects on consumption.
Second, we establish how these indirect effects operate, and that they are a feature of the nationwide program, rather than of the evaluation sample only. Third, we point out that the unit of analysis to evaluate this class of policies is the entire local economy, rather than only the treated. The implication for the design of policy evaluations is that the experimental data should be randomized at the village level, as done in the Progresa evaluation, rather than within a given locality, as is often the case.
We also add to the literature that studies consumption smoothing in low-income economies by showing how a cash injection into a group of households affects all families living in the same village. Consistent with the predictions of a simple risk sharing model, we find that ineligible households living in treated villages receive more informal loans (e.g., Rosenzweig, 1988; Townsend, 1995; Udry, 1994) , more transfers from family and friends (e.g., Rosenzweig, 1988b; Rosenzweig and Stark, 1989; Fafchamps and Lund, 2003) , and reduce their livestock and grains (e.g., Deaton, 1992; Rosenzweig and Wolpin, 1993; Udry, 1995; Lim and Townsend, 1998 ). In addition, unlike most of the empirical literature, we can identify to what extent a household's positive income shock benefits the other village members: for every 100 pesos transferred by Progresa to the eligibles households, the consumption of ineligible households increases by approximately 11 pesos.
The paper is organized as follows: Section 2 describes the structure of the program, the data collected for its evaluation, and the village characteristics indicating there is scope for risk-sharing. In Section 3 we use the predictions from a simple risk-sharing model to derive a set of testable hypotheses; Section 4 discusses the identification of the parameters of interest, and Section 5 estimates and interprets these parameters, showing there is a positive indirect treatment effect on consumption that occurs through higher loans and transfers. Section 6 rules out alternative explanations for this indirect effect and Section 7 checks that the estimated effects are consistent with each other. Section 8 concludes.
2 The data and village characteristics
Program structure and data characteristics
Progresa (currently re-named Oportunidades) is an ongoing Mexican poverty alleviation program that targets poor households, providing grants to improve education, health, and nutrition. Started in 1997 and with transfers beginning around March 1998, this program had about 5 million recipient households in more than 92,000 localities by the end of 2006. The program provides grants in the form of nutritional subsidies, as well as scholarships for children attending third to ninth grade. The recipients of the transfers are women. The grants, paid bimonthly, are conditional upon family visits to health centers, women's participation in informal workshops on health and nutrition issues, and verification that children attended classes at least 85% of the time (Levy, 2006) . Scholarships are larger for higher school grades and for girls going to secondary school.
The monthly amounts range between 70 pesos for all third graders to 225 pesos for males and 255 pesos for females in ninth grade. 1,2 These payments correspond to approximately one half to two thirds of the wage a child would earn by working full time (Schultz, 2004) , and cannot exceed a monthly total of 625 pesos per household. 3 The actual monthly grants up to November 1999 are sizeable, averaging 200 pesos per household, or 32.5 pesos per adult equivalent. This is about 23% and 16% of the average food consumption per adult equivalent for the poor and non-poor in control villages (which are respectively 140 and 200 pesos).
The experimental data for the evaluation of Progresa contain information on households from 506 poor rural villages in seven different states. Because of the program's geographic phase-in, 186 villages are randomized out and receive the treatment only at the end of 1999.
Program eligibility depends on poverty status, and households are classified as being eligible or ineligible according to an assessment of their permanent income from information collected in the September 1997 census of localities. 4 There were two rounds of selection of eligible households in Progresa. 52% of households were classified as eligible in 1997. A few months later, but before the beginning of the program, 54% of the households initially classified as ineligible were added to the beneficiary group. However, about 60% of these households did not receive the transfers because of administrative problems, irrespective of their compliance with the eligibility rules. Thus, this group of re-classified households is in practice a mix of treated households and eligible but non-treated households who may actually expect transfers and behave accordingly. Because their behavior and incentives are unclear, we drop them from our data and keep only households initially classified as poor and non-poor families whose status was not revised. 5 These re-classified households are both in treatment and control villages, in equal share because of the village randomization. Therefore the characteristics of the non-poor in treatment and control villages are not systematically different.
The households are informed that, after they are classified as eligible or ineligible, their status would not change until November 1999, irrespective of any income variation. Thus, households have no incentives to reduce their labor supply or lie about their income. Besides, the current income is not used to compute the poverty index that determines program eligibility.
In practice there were hardly any status changes at the end of 1999.
After the start of the program, all residents of control and treatment villages are first interviewed in November 1998 -about a semester after the beginning of the payments -and then in May and November 1999. This provides information from three different points in time after the beginning of the program. We also have pre-program data, collected in September 1997 and March 1998, which we use in the empirical analysis whenever possible.
The data can be divided into four groups: poor and non-poor households in treatment and control villages. Only poor households in treatment areas receive the Progresa transfers. Poor households in control villages know they will be included in the program at the end of 1999, provided they are still eligible and the program is still in place. 6 Figure 1 shows the structure of the data and experimental design.
The sample size for the ineligibles varies across the three data waves: we observe 5280, 4443, and 4502 households in November 1998, May 1999, and November 1999. The sample size changes in the same way for the poor. These differences may be due to household dissolution or death, to temporary or permanent migration, or to household members being unavailable for interviews. To confirm there are no differential attrition rates by village type for the non-poor, we checked whether the ratio of ineligible residents in treatment and control villages is stable across the three waves, which it is: the share of non-poor living in treatment villages is 61% in the first two semesters and 60% in the third one.
The need for risk-sharing
Consumption smoothing is especially important in developing countries, since, when income is low, a negative shock might have catastrophic consequences. This section provides evidence on the need for informal insurance in the sampled villages, in which there is hardly any income diversification and formal insurance is absent.
The September 1997 data show that agriculture is the main activity in 97% of villages, and the sole activity in 56% of localities (out of the remaining 44% of villages with other activities, 50% engage in cattle farming, and 28% in trade). 88% of villages report corn as the main (and often sole) crop, while beans are the secondary crop in 60% of localities. Only 42% of villages cultivate 3 different crops. Thus, crop diversification does not play an important role in income smoothing.
These rural economies are subject to natural disasters: on average, 39, 57, and 30% of village residents suffered from at least one calamity in the 6 months prior to November 1998, May 1999, and November 1999. Water shortages, frost, and floods, all of which vary within village, are the most typical shocks, hitting a total of 30, 9, and 5% of households in the three periods, Other natural disasters such as earthquakes, hurricanes, fires, or pests are less frequent. Income also varies substantially both between households (the cross sectional coefficient of variation, CV, is 1.5 in 1998 for the control villages), as well as within household over time (the longitudinal income CV for the average household in control villages is 1).
Despite the need for insurance, formal credit and insurance institutions are virtually absent. In November 1998, fewer than 1% of villages have credit or consumption cooperatives, and fewer than 3% have NGO's or production associations. On the other hand, informal institutions abound: 89% of villages engage in communal activities or chores; 85% of villages have a community assembly, 87% a parent association, and 38% a religious organization. Further, these villages are small: the average number of households per locality is 51 and the median 46. In addition, mobility is low. In November 1998 and 1999 only 5% of the total number of individuals had left the household in the previous 5 years, 20% of whom lives in the same village as the household of origin. A consequence of this low mobility is that most families are related. Angelucci et al. (2007) report that 80% of the households have at least one related family member in the village, that the average size of this extended family network is 7.7 households, and that 52% of its members are eligible for the program, so extended families are composed of both poor and non-poor households. 7 Altogether, the high income risk, the absence of formal risk-sharing institutions, and the abundance of long-lasting relationships between village members strongly suggest that villagers engage in risk-sharing activities.
The effect of Progresa in the presence of risk-sharing
In this section we discuss the potential effect of Progresa for ineligible households if village members share risk. Consider a risk-sharing model in which agents fully insure against idiosyncratic risk by pooling resources and consuming a fixed share of total income, so that, conditional on aggregate resources, their consumption is independent of their individual income. 8 One of the implications of this model is that, given a pair of agents 1 and 2, an increase in agent 1's income will increase aggregate resources, resulting in higher consumption for both agents.
This efficient resource allocation is achieved through a series of informal loans and transfers. Therefore, the higher income for agent 1 will also result in an increase in net transfers to agent 2.
Suppose agents 1 and 2 represent eligible and ineligible households in Progresa villages. As 8 We sketch this model in the Appendix, available online; see also, e.g., Mace (1991) or Townsend (1994) .
the program increases eligible households' income while leaving ineligible households' income unchanged, the consumption of both eligible and ineligible families will increase, and so will the net transfers to the ineligibles. These results generate our testable hypotheses:
Hp 1: Progresa increases the consumption of ineligible households in treatment villages.
Hp 2: Progresa increases net transfers to ineligible households in treatment villages.
One could object to our stylized model for a number of reasons. First, Progresa may represent an unprecedented event for the recipients, altering their income process. This, in turn, may reduce the amount of risk-sharing between villagers. As an extreme case, the treated may decide to stop insuring the ineligibles now that their income is higher, since these informal agreements cannot be legally enforced. 9 We believe this is not happening in our data for the following reasons. To begin with, Progresa is not an unprecedented event in our villages, as their residents are used to receiving social assistance in many different forms. 10 Therefore, from the villagers' perspective Progresa is just one of the many existing social assistance programs.
Further, it is unlikely that Progresa changes the income process substantially because the program transfer is initially guaranteed only for less than two years and it is mainly in the form of scholarships, which stop as soon as the eligible children complete the subsidized school grades. On the other hand, the cost of not reciprocating may be the exclusion from future mutual insurance or other punitive sanctions, especially since the receipt of this transfer is publicly observed. For these reasons, we expect the cost of future exclusion from the insurance network to more than offset the benefit of not sharing the transfers. Consistent with this conclusion, we find no difference in the longitudinal variation of consumption in treatment and control villages, which would be the case if Progresa changed the amount of risk-sharing. The difference in the coefficients of variation is -0.002, with a standard error of 0.004. We also compared their distributions, which are almost identical.
Second, the above discussion abstracts from the conditionality of the program. The design of Progresa requires the recipients to have health checks and send children to school to receive the income transfers. Since complying with these requirements may be costly for the treated, the net value of the Progresa transfer may be small and the change in aggregate resources negligible. However, the transfers are in practice unconditional for most of the recipients. This is because most eligible children were already going to school before the program started (in 1997, primary and secondary school enrollment rates for the eligibles were 90% and 60%).
Moreover, compliance with the health requirements is not very time consuming. For example, adults are asked to have only annual health checks. 11 In addition, most households would have had health checks even in the absence of the program (e.g. in November 1998 72% of households in control villages had at least one health check during the previous 6 months). In sum, complying with the program rules is likely not very costly for most recipients.
Third, while we consider insurance within the village, risk-sharing may cross village boundaries. However, if risk sharing occurs both within and between villages, the net financial transfers towards treatment villages should decrease, as Progresa may crowd out private transfers (Albarran and Attanasio, 2004) . If this were the case, our estimates would be lower bounds of the true program effects on ineligibles' consumption and transfers.
Identification and estimation
Our data consist of a partial-population experiment (Moffitt, 2001 ): the program is offered only to poor households living in a set of randomly chosen villages and the data provide information on all village residents, eligible and ineligible, living in both treatment and control villages.
This experimental design enables us to identify how offering Progresa to the poor affects the behavior of the non-poor under fairly weak assumptions.
Define Y 1i as the potential outcome for non-poor (N P i = 1) in treatment villages (T i = 1)
in the presence of the treatment. Y 0i is the potential outcome for non-poor (N P i = 1) in treatment villages (T i = 1) in the absence of the treatment. The observed outcome is:
The treatment is the availability of Progresa for poor households (N P i = 0) in treatment villages (T i = 1). The average effect of the program on non-poor households living in treatment villages, which we call the Indirect Treatment Effect (ITE), is then:
Under the assumptions of random assignment, the expected value of Y 0 , the potential outcome in the absence of the treatment, is the same in both treatment and control villages, i.e. E(
. If there are no program spillover effects to control villages, the difference
identifies the ITE. Despite the randomization, equation (1) does not identify an average IT E if non-poor households in control villages are indirectly affected by the program. However, if there are indirect program effects for non-poor households in both treatment and control villages, the sign of these effects is likely the same for the two groups. In this case, the above parameter identifies a lower bound to the IT E. For example, suppose that the increase in school enrollment of treated children reduces child labor. This decrease in labor supply may results in higher employment and earnings for ineligible households in both treatment and control villages.
We obtain estimates of the IT Es comparing mean observed outcomes for the non-poor in treatment and control villages. If we do the same for poor households, we estimate the average treatment effect (ATE) on the eligibles under the assumption that E(
. In practice the difference between the ATE and the average treatment on the treated effect is negligible, because about 97% of eligible households participate to the program. 12 
Indirect Treatment Effect on consumption: estimates and causes
Now we can express our two testable hypotheses in terms of treatment effects:
Hp 1: Progresa increases the consumption (C) of ineligible households in treatment villages, i.e.
IT E C > 0.
Hp 2: Progresa increases net transfers (L) to the ineligibles in treatment villages, i.e. IT E L > 0. Table 1 shows food consumption averages, as well as estimates of treatment effects for both ineligible and eligible households. We compute monthly food consumption per adult equivalent to ease the comparison between poor and non-poor households, since their sizes differ (for example, in November 1999 the average household sizes are 5.8 and 5 adult equivalents for the poor and the non-poor). We use an equivalence scale estimated from these data in Di Maro The estimated IT Es are robust to a variety of checks. First, we verify that the non-poor are not erroneously receiving the program transfers by checking the administrative records.
Effect on consumption
Second, we find that the estimated effects are not caused by a disproportionate increase in the consumption of few families. To test this hypothesis, we estimate average consumption for treatment and control households, grouping them according to their poverty level. Figure 2 provides kernel estimates of these averages, and shows that consumption is higher in treatment villages for all poverty levels. We also regress consumption on the welfare index interacted with the treatment dummy and found the interaction term is positive and significant. We further compare the densities of consumption for the non-poor in treatment and control villages. We find that low consumption is less frequent and high consumption more frequent in treatment villages.
Third, in Table 2 we estimate treatment effects on the caloric content of food consumed, rather than on its monetary value. This exercise is a useful robustness check because, to compute the value of home-produced food, we had to impute prices from purchased goods. If the imputed prices were inaccurate, this would provide imprecise consumption data. We find a significant increase in daily caloric intake of 178 kcal per adult equivalent for the ineligibles and 340 for the eligibles. The estimates are obtained by pooling consumption data for May and November 1999 and are both significant at the 99% level. We also compute the quantity of food consumed in 1999 for several types of aliments, and find significant increases in the consumption of tomatoes, carrots, meat, eggs, corn, and rice for ineligible households, as shown in the rest of Table 2 . 13 The parameters we estimated so far exploit only the cross-sectional variation in our data.
We also use pre-program food expenditure (observed in March 1998) to estimate the IT E either using difference-in-difference estimators, or adding pre-program expenditure as a conditioning variable. We do not present difference-in-difference estimates as our key results because the March 1998 data provide information on expenditures only, so we do not observe pre-program consumption quantities. Expenditure and consumption may differ considerably if consumption of home-produced goods is a sizeable fraction of total food consumption, which is likely among indigent families. Moreover, rather than asking detailed item-by-item questions, as in the later data waves, the March 1998 data report only expenditures by food group, probably understating true expenditures. In any case, the difference in pre-program food expenditure between the nonpoor in treatment and control villages is either 0.57 pesos (with a standard error of 10.37), or -2.86 (and a standard error of 9.00), according to which of two available measures we use. 14 We report a subset of the estimated effects in Table A2 of the Appendix, where we also experiment with different ways to deal with outliers and with adding a set of covariates at baseline values: 13 We also estimate positive and significant ITEs on the log monetary value of food consumption for different food categories, i.e. fruits and vegetables, grains, meat and fish in Table A1 of the Appendix.
14 We obtain the first measure from total weekly food expenditure data, and the second one aggregating weekly expenditures for the following food categories: vegetables and fruits; grains and cereal; meat, fish, and dairy products; industrial products. the significance of the effects is largely unchanged.
In unreported regressions, we estimate the IT E on total non-food consumption, but find no set of consistently significant effects across different specifications: the point estimates are positive, especially in May 1999, but not always significant. This is probably not surprising, because our non-food consumption data are not as accurately measured as food consumption (e.g. the recall period is much longer) and non-food consumption is lumpier. However, in 1999 the treatment effect on non-food consumption is positive and significant for the poor and it amounts to 6.1 and 5.3 pesos per adult equivalent per month in May and November.
Effect on loans and transfers
We now proceed to test the hypothesis of positive IT Es on loans and transfers. Unfortunately we have no direct information on the identity and location of network members, so it is not clear how to define a social network. However, the data presented above suggest that neighbors, relatives, and friends who live in the village may be an important part of it. Moreover, the evidence from the existing literature confirms that village-level networks are important. For example, Townsend (1994) and many others find a very high level of risk-sharing between villagers in various developing countries; Udry (1994) reports that almost no loan in his sample of northern Nigerian villages crosses the village boundary, and he argues geographic proximity generates informational advantages.
We have information on the receipt of loans in the previous six months, and of monetary and in kind transfers from family and friends during the previous month. Credit is informal: 70% of loans occur among friends or relatives (and a further 9% through local moneylenders).
Our data suffer from the following limitations: first, we do not observe the identity of lenders and donors, nor whether they belong to poor or non-poor households. Second, while in principle we also have data on transfers given, this variable is unreliable, hence we cannot build a good net transfers variable. For example, in the November 1999 data 319 households report they received transfers from families living in the same village, while only 41 households appear to have made a transfer to a family in the same village, implying that on average each donor makes transfers to 8 different families. We think this unlikely, and rather suspect that the poor may be afraid to admit they are sharing the Progresa grants with the non-poor. Third, we observe both loans and transfers only in November 1998, when very little money had been transferred to treated households. In the remaining waves, we observe loans in May 1999, and transfers in November 1999.
We report means, standard deviations, and proportion of households receiving loans or transfers in Table 3 . About 12% of the ineligibles and 8% of the eligibles receive either loans, transfers and remittances (which we call "total credit resources") in November 1998. The average monthly receipt amounts to some 400 pesos for the ineligibles, and to 220 pesos for the eligibles. Interestingly, this pattern is common for all variables and semesters: a higher proportion of the ineligibles receives transfers or loans, compared to the eligibles, and their average receipt is larger, both in treatment and in control villages. This could be a scale effect: the ineligibles are wealthier than the eligibles, therefore they earn, consume, and get higher transfers. Further, loans are larger in size than monetary transfers. This is consistent with the evidence for the Philippines in Fafchamps and Lund (2003) , i.e. that risk is shared through informal loans, rather than through transfers. On the other hand, however, the respondents are likely to under-report the true extent of in-kind gifts they received. For example, they may not consider a meal consumed at a friend's place as a transfer. Irrespective of this potential underreporting, both the proportion of recipients and the size of the receipt are larger in treatment than in control areas for the non-poor (with a couple of exceptions for monetary and in-kind transfers), while the pattern is more mixed for the poor.
To test our prediction that the program results in more loans and transfers for the ineligibles, we estimate treatment effects on the probability of receipt and on the size of loans and transfers. These results are in Table 4 . We report both OLS and tobit estimates of the effects on the levels, since tobit is inconsistent in the presence of heteroskedasticity (although the estimator performs well under moderate departures from the homoskedasticity assumption). Since only a small share of households receives loans or transfers, the estimated effects on loan and transfer size are very sensitive to outliers. For this reason, we consider the probit estimates as the most reliable of the set. 15 The ineligibles in treatment villages may receive more net resources from both the treated, whose income has increased, and other ineligibles, who may shift resources away from the treated to the ineligibles within their network, as the former group has become less needy. Some ineligible households will also have good income shocks. However, because of the randomization, the distribution of these shocks does not differ between treatment and control villages, and is differenced out in the computation of treatment effects.
The main conclusion from this exercise is that the non-poor receive more transfers and or roughly 50%, and its level grows by about 4 pesos or 23% of the observed consumption increase in the same period. Thus, the magnitude of the estimated effects is consistent with the size of the consumption increase, and suggests that the effect on the credit market is an important determinant of the estimated consumption increase.
As a minor point, the IT E for in-kind transfers is significant both in 1998 and 1999, but positive first and then negative. This may suggest that households transfer more food or clothes when there is little extra cash in the treated localities, while they shift the composition of transfers towards money when there is more currency in the local economy.
In-kind transfers to the poor decrease in 1999, but we find no other significant decrease in loans and transfers to eligible households. This is counterintuitive, as the treated should receive fewer transfer, since the program makes them better off (Albarran and Attanasio, 2004) .
Probably this effect is offset by eligible households' increased ability to borrow using their Progresa entitlement as a collateral. The public transfers do crowd out private transfers to the poor, but not from other villagers: migrant remittances to eligible households decrease by about 144 pesos per month in November 1999 (with a standard error of 78), a 30% decrease compared to the level in control villages. The likelihood of receiving remittances does not change, nor is there any significant effect for the ineligibles.
In unreported robustness checks, we estimate the IT E on net transfers. The results are broadly unchanged, although the estimates are less precise, consistent with our suspicion that we are mainly adding noise to our dependent variable because the donation data are unreliable.
For example, the OLS estimates are 3 pesos in 1998 and 3.3 in November 1999 (the standard errors are 1.86 and 3.2).
Alternative channels
There are alternative mechanisms that might cause a consumption increase for the ineligibles.
The estimated consumption increase (C) may be caused by higher labor (Y l ) and goods market (Y g ) incomes, lower savings (S) and investment (I), besides higher loans and transfers (L), as summarized in the following household accounting identity:
The symbol ∆ represents the indirect program effect for each variable. 16 
Labor market
Labor earnings for the non-poor may increase if the program affects the poor labor supply. In theory Progresa may have the following effects on the treated: it may decrease child labor, as some treated children switch from employment to schooling, and reduce adult labor supply through an income effect. This may result in higher labor income for the non-poor through higher wages and increases in their labor supply. In practice we do not expect to find any sizeable effect for the following reasons. First, Parker and Skoufias (2000) estimate a 2.5 to 3 percentage point reduction in child labor for boys and 1.2 percentage points for girls. Since child labor is only a small fraction of total labor, the overall reduction in labor supply is probably not large enough to generate sizeable general equilibrium effects. Second, the program income effect is likely small, given the extreme poverty of treated households and the limited duration of guaranteed existence of the program.
We investigate whether Progresa changes labor income for the ineligibles by testing whether their labor earnings differ in treatment and control villages. We compute monthly labor earnings per adult equivalent as the sum of income from primary and secondary occupations, using reported wages and hours worked, and earnings from informal work activities (provision of transportation, cooking, sewing, repairs, carpentry, and various other paid services). Table 5 reports estimates of the treatment effects for both the non-poor and the poor. These effects are never statistically different from zero. In unreported regressions, we tested for differences in hours of work, which never change for the non-poor. Thus, we find no evidence that the ineligibles' increase in consumption is caused by higher labor income.
Goods market
Progresa may affect the goods market through at least two channels. First, poor households' higher expenditure may increase goods prices in treatment villages. Second, the non-poor may increase sales to the poor (e.g. if the non-poor are land owners who sell produce and meat to the poor). In practice we do not expect sizeable effects, since this market is fairly integrated.
Chicken, meat, and medicines are sold in less than 10% of the villages, and even staples such as corn, flour, and milk are not sold in 53% of the sampled villages. 17 If one store serves a cluster of treated and control villages, which is the case if, e.g., the stores and farmers markets are located in the municipal capital, any potential effect on prices and earnings caused by the program will equally affect all villages in the cluster, with no differential effect in treatment villages.
To test for effects on the goods market, we first compare prices in treatment and control localities. To do so, we consider village prices by good over time. We provide details on the creation of the price variables in the Appendix, as well as estimates of the price differences between treatment and control villages (Tables A3 and A4 ). While we find a small positive effect on 5 out of 36 food prices in November 1998, prices of staples such as rice, beans, corn, and chicken do not change. Therefore, we do not expect any substantial increase in the cost of the food basket. Moreover, we find no food price change in the later waves, nor evidence of changes for non-food prices. The evidence presented here is consistent with earlier work by
Hoddinott et al. (2000).
We further test whether there is a program effect on net sales of agricultural products and animals for poor and non-poor households. 18 Table 6 shows estimates of the IT Es and AT Es for these variables. The main result for the ineligibles is that their income from net sales is not increasing: in fact, in 1998 their agricultural sales fall slightly, while livestock net sales do not change. Agricultural net sales drop by 0.6 pesos for treated poor in 1998. From those results we conclude that changes in the goods market are very unlikely to cause the observed increase in consumption for the ineligibles.
Savings and Investment
The households in our sample hold livestock and grains, which they might use as a buffer against income fluctuations. We investigate whether Progresa affects the stock of animals and grains.
In Table 7 we compare the changes in the stock of horses, donkeys, oxen, cows, poultry, pigs, goats, and rabbits, in treatment and control villages. For the ineligibles, the stocks of oxen, goats, and poultry decreases between September 1997 and November 1998, and is stable in later waves (with the exception of the stock of cows, which grows between May and November 1999).
We check for similar patterns in the stock of corn and beans, the two most commonly produced crops. While we do not observe the stock of grains, we know how much was produced and sold, as well as the amount of home-produced grains that the household consumed.
Therefore, we can infer the change in the stock by comparing the difference between net sales and consumption of home-produced grains. This comparison hinges on the assumption that the pre-program stock does not differ between households in treatment and control villages because of the randomization. Table 8 shows that, while net sales do not change, in May 1999 the ineligibles in treatment villages increase consumption of own corn by about one kilo per month per adult equivalent, worth approximately 1.7 pesos. This suggests the non-poor are depleting their stock of corn. We find no significant changes in the stock of beans.
These results suggest that the program relaxes borrowing constraints for the non-poor, who can now receive extra resources from the poor if they are hit by a negative income shock (Deaton, 1991) . Further, the size of the stock may be smaller because the program's beneficial effect on health may reduce both the likelihood and the size of future income drops (Carroll 1997) . We also investigate whether poor and non-poor villagers are changing their investment behavior, although it is difficult to empirically distinguish savings from investment. For example, the poor's purchase of livestock may be for investment purposes, as animals are productive assets both for the sale of meat, cheese, and eggs, or for farming. Table 9 tests for differences in the likelihood and the value of agricultural-related expenditures (e.g. to purchase seeds, fertilizers, and machinery) and purchases of animals. The evidence for the ineligibles is not conclusive. While we find an increase in the purchase of animals in November 1998, worth 0.22 pesos, we know their stock of animals is decreasing.
Therefore probably they are both buying and selling more animals, as well as consuming part of their livestock, since Table 6 showed no change in net sales. Considering eligible households only, there is an average treatment effect of 3520 pesos out of a transfer of 4000 pesos. Including the ineligibles increases the average treatment effect by 432 additional pesos. Therefore, failure to consider the effect on the ineligibles would result in a 12% underestimate of the average treatment effect on consumption. 22 The finding that the non-poor in treated villages are affected by the program has implications for the design of future experiments: since the entire village is affected, directly or indirectly, by the treatment, it is essential to randomize at the village level, as occurred for the evaluation of Progresa. The common practice of selecting the treatment and control groups 20 We obtained household-level estimates of loans and transfers by multiplying the estimated IT Es from Tablefrom the same community would have two shortcomings. First, it would bias the estimates of the treatment on the treated effect, if the control group indirectly benefits from the program. Second, by not estimating these indirect treatment effects it would fail to capture the full policy impact. In a similar setting to the one considered here, this would result in a double underestimation of the treatment effect.
Conclusions
Using the unique design of the experimental data for the evaluation of Progresa, we show We report the standard deviations of the means and the standard errors, in brackets, of the treatment effects. The latter are clustered at the village level. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively. The set of conditioning variables we add to the regressions in the left panel are: household poverty index, land size, head of household gender, age, whether speak indigenous language, literacy; at the locality level poverty index and number of households. All variables are at 1997 values. Standard errors in brackets clustered at the village level. ***, **, * indicates significance at the 1, 5, 10 % level respectively. We add the same set of conditioning variables described in Table 1 . The results are unchanged if we add conditioning variables, with the exception of the ATE estimate for November 1999, which is now significant at the 10% level. 
